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The foregoing analysis of immigration waves suggests that, typically,
demographic swings are induced by changes in economic conditions
but, in turn, have important feedback effects on the economy. This
chapter builds on this to develop a fuller analytical conception of
economic-demographic relations during long swings. It also considers
whether recent experience is consistent with this viewpoint and dis-
cusses implications for the future. To start with, however, attention is
focussed on a methodological issue.
ARE KUZNETS CYCLES A STATISTICAL
ILLUSION?
Two arguments in the affirmative should be distinguished. The first
is that long swings may be artificially produced by certain defects in
the raw data. For example, if the population is underenumerated at one
census date, but correctly counted at the preceding and following
dates, this single error will bias the growth rate in the second period
upward relative to that in the first period. However, while such bias is
possible with regard to any single series, it seems highly implausible
that a large number of series from widely differing sources would
share a common bias creating the illusion of long swings with similar
timing. To the variety of series and sources relating to output, capital,
and demographic variables already covered in Chapter 2, one may, if
necessary, add still more that show roughly conforming long swings:
patents [140], land sales and prices [17, 33, 131], financial series [102],
transportation and other public utilities [76, 168], incorporations [60],
and international trade and payments [216].
The second argument is that long swings may be an artifact due
to the particular statistical method used in smoothing the raw data.
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Bird and others have shown that a moving average technique, es-
pecially of the type employed by Kuznets may "create" long cycles
where only short cycles exist [18]. Adelman, using the new technique
of spectral analysis, finds, for the series she analyzes, "no evidence for
the existence of a long-cycle component in the business fluctuations
of the U.S. economy since 1890," and suggests "it is likely that the
long swings which have been observed in the U.S. economy since
1890 are due in part to the introduction of spurious long cycles by the
smoothing process, and in part to the necessity for averaging over a
statistically small number of random shocks" [10, p. 459].
Sucharguments obviously do not apply to those series in which
long swings are observed in the raw data. Several of these are assem-
bled in Figure 13—residential construction, incorporations, iminigra-
tion, and capital imports. The large fluctuations in these series are so
manifest, particularly prior to World War I, that they impressed
themselves on analysts who were not looking for long swings and who
were often not even aware of the idea. Moreover, the series show
similar, though not identical, timing. Clearly there is no statistical
illusion here. It is true that long swings are not readily apparent in
the raw data on aggregate output in Figure 13; indeed, most output
series, in which processes of inventory change play an important role,
exhibit such high annual variability that the longer term movement,
if it exists, is far from obvious. However, since swings in the raw data
are shown by one group of series, and since these series relate to fin-
portant aspects of resource growth, the question naturally arises
whether processing other series so as to reduce short-term variability
may reveal corresponding long-term movements in them too. Leaving
aside for the moment the Adelman results, the answer to this question
is yes, the movements appear in a number of other series, although
differences in statistical method yield varying conclusions on more
demanding issues such as frequency, timing, and amplitude. It seems
reasonable to conclude that since roughly synchronous fluctuations are
observed in the raw data for series reflecting capital formation and
growth of the labor supply, that similar movements obtained in
processed data for other series have a basis in reality also.1
1Clearly,this statement does not mean that these fluctuations are necessarily
self-generating—a matter taken up in the next section. The issue at stake here is
simply the reality of the fluctuations.
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RPOBATIONS, BESIDENTLkL On first glance, the Adelman analysis is disturbing, since here is a
TAL IMPORTS,1820—1964
method that appears to yield negative results. True, spectral analysis
is a new technique, and there is as yet so little experience with it in
the analysis of annual economic time series that it is hard to judge
how much the results may depend on the particular assumptions made
in applying it. But a closer look at the study suggests more concrete
reasons for reservations about the findings. First, construction was
omitted from her analysis because its spectrum "showed an unusually
large amount of distortion at the higher frequencies due to the filter-
ing process" [10, p. 459]. The need to omit this series is especially
troubling because, if there is any economic sector on which some pro-
fessional consensus exists as to the reality of fluctuations of the Kuznets
cycle variety, it is this one. Second, only one demographic series was
included, total population, and it too was omitted in arriving at her
final conclusion because its spectrum "suggests that any genuine
cyclical phenomena which may exist in population are longer in dura-
6 tion than 15 years. More work is required on this series before any
more detailed conclusions can be drawn" [10, p. 459]. Again, the
analysisexcludes a series important for the long-swings hypothesis.
Not that it much matters in this case; in the population series used,
whichis not the annual series used by Kuznets or me, the estimates
for about two-thirds of the years, 1790—1957, are obtained by linear
interpolation between decennial census figures [187, p. 1]. Finally,
a those series on which the results of the study actually rest start only
in 1890, and thus relate chiefly to a period in which statistical analysis
of time series for evidence of long swings is seriously handicapped by
the occurrence of two world wars. The immense expansion and sub-
Legend for Figure 13
1. Index of industrial and commercial production, 1899 weights (Frickey).
2. Gross national product, billions of 1954 dollars (Commerce).
3. Aggregate index of incorporations (Evans).
4. Number of incorporations (Dun and Bradstreet).
5. Production of nonfarm housekeeping dwelling units (Gottlieb).
8. Number of nonfarrn dwelling units started (Blank).
7. Gross alien immigration per thousand total population per year.
8. Net alien immigration per thousand total population per year.
9. Net capital imports, millions of current dollars.
'20'30'40'50'60'70 SouRcE: Table B-i.
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wars resulted in a major departure from the historical long-swing
pattern.2 A central feature of this pattern (one reason for this is sug-
gested in the next section) was concurrent swings in the growth rates
of GNP and aggregate construction. However, the two wars, with their
attendant restrictions on construction, forced a break in the pattern,
with CNP moving in positive conformity to the expansion and sub-
sequent contraction of government expenditure, and construction in
inverse conformity. The result is to interject an additional fluctuation
into the usual long-swing relation, differing in timing between the two






Thisadditional fluctuation appears, of course, not only in these two
series but in others as well. While it is eliminated by a statistical pro-
cedure averaging the intervals both of expansion and contraction in
government expenditure, such as Kuznets' decade averages, it would
clearly influence the results of spectral analysis, the more so, the more
the period studied is dominated by major wars.3
2 It is possible that the Civil War is another case of this sort, but the data are
not now sufficiently complete to determine this.
This paragraph perhaps answers the question posed by several discussants of
Hickman's paper [47, 63, 781, namely, whether experience since the 1930's is to
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An implication of these observations is that the issue of the "real-
ity" of long swings is unlikely to be resolved, pro or con, by purely
statistical studies, valuable and necessary though these are. To the
extent one concentrates on output series relating primarily to the war-
torn twentieth century, as is true of the Adelman study, the more one
is likely to be unconvinced. On the other hand, by emphasizing periods
less disturbed by war, as well as series in which the swings are promi-
nent in unprocessed data, a stronger case can be built, though this
inevitably leaves doubt as to current relevance. In any case, it is clear
that statistical analysis needs to be complemented by economic analy-
sis: Are the observations on long swings consistent with a model of
relationships based on economic theory? This is the question I seek to
contribute to solving in this chapter.
THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
Although the intellectual progenitors of the model suggested here are
numerous, particular acknowledgement is due contributions by Kuz-
nets[102—105, 107], Abramovitz [4—6], Isard[92,93], Hickman
[90], and Burnham Campbell [29, 30]. The model proceeds in three
steps: (1) the impact of aggregate demand on labor market condi-
tions, (2) the effect of labor market conditions on the number and
spending behavior of households, and (3) the reaction of the latter
on aggregate demand.
Aggregate Demand and the Labor Market
Assume, to start with, that growth of GNP in the last business
cycle or two occurred at less than the full-employment growth rate
and that the economy has accumulated excess capacity with regard to
labor. One manifestation of this would be a tendency toward a rising
unemployment rate at successive business cycle peaks (or troughs).
Assume, next, that for some reason the rate of growth of private in-
vestment rises, producing a corresponding upsurge in the growth of
aggregate demand, and that the higher level is sustained for some
be interpreted as one long swing or two shorter swings. The additional fluctuation
is directly due to the movement in government spending (cf. [90, p. 4931), and
is thus an interruption in the basic long swing.
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time. The spatial distribution of this increased demand and the em-
ployment opportunities thus created would not necessarily conform
to that of the existing labor supply. On the contrary, in a developing
economy the locus of investment opportunities tends to be predomi-
nantly nonfarm, whereas the increase of the labor force through nat-
ural growth of the working-age population is disproportionately large
in the farm sector.
The increased growth in aggregate product demand would have a
corresponding effect on the demand for labor in the favorably affected
centers of economic activity. Initially, one would expect the increased
labor input requirements thus created to be met locally through an
appropriate movement in the rate of change of the unemployment rate,
and perhaps via a rise in the growth rate of hours. Increasing tight-
ness of the labor market would tend to be reflected too in an increase
in the rate of change of wage rates. The longer this process continues,
the more likely it becomes that labor force growth in the favored
areas will be enhanced by migration in response to the new employ-
ment opportunities. The origins of the migration would be lower wage
areas elsewhere in the country (notably the older farm areas) and/or
abroad. Labor force growth might also be raised by an increase in
labor force participation rates of reserve labor groups such as females,
youths, and older persons. The relative role of the several possible
sources of increased labor input in satisfying the new demand would
depend on the supply elasticities of the groups involved.
Reaction on Household Growth in Centers of Increased Demand
To the extent that increased labor-input requirements are met via
unemployment or hours changes, one would usually expect the stimulus
to household growth to be relatively mild, since the beneficiaries of the
increased income are most likely to be members of established house-
holds in the area. To be sure, the slackened growth rate in the imme-
diately preceding cycle(s) and the resulting higher average unem-
ployment rate may have led some young persons to defer marriage or
those already married and living with their parents to postpone estab-
lishing a separate household. For these, the progressive improvement
of labor market conditions would lead to implementing previously de-
ferred decisions. The longer the foregoing slack period, the more siz-
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able the quantitative effect of this would probably be. Moreover, if
the labor market impact were for some reason particularly favorable
for those in the household-forming ages, plans might be advanced
and household growth accelerated through a general reduction in the
average age of marriage and of household formation.
Typically, however, one would expect a more immediate and siz-
able effect on household growth in the centers of increased demand
if the increased labor input requirements were met via migration
flows, because migration flows add directly to the number of house-
holds at the point of destination. In this case the growth in persons
employed is more nearly matched by corresponding growth in the
number of households. This is the special significance of the migration
response: it has a much greater impact than other sources of labor
input on household growth in the areas of increased labor demand.
Effect of Household Growth on Aggre gate Spending
Households newly established in an area generate demands, not
only for housing but for urban services generally, as well as for the
furnishing of new homes. They thereby tend to create an urban de-
velopment boom—new residential construction and new municipal in-
vestment in services associated with it, as well as new business invest-
ment in retailing and similar activities. (The mechanism might of
course involve an intermediate stage in which new migrants displace
previous residents in established areas and the latter are those im-
mediately involved in new real estate development.) Thus the in-
crease in households, typically associated with the migration flow,
leads to further growth not only in consumer spending but in private
and public investment as well, and it is this induced rise in the growth
of aggregate demand which tends to sustain and prolong the ex-
pansion.
Why Kuznets Cycles Rather than Business Cycles?
Established households whose head or members have profited
from new employment and income opportunities would generate a
multiplier effect via new consumer spending; possibly, new business
investment would also be induced. A reaction of this type figures
frequently in theoretical discussion of the regular business cycle.
Why should the present chain of events, operating through house-
r
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hold growth result in a more protracted boom? One possible answer
lies in the composition of the induced demand which results when
household growth intervenes between the labor market response and
the increased spending this response produces. This view would
emphasize the central importance of housing and real estate develop-
ment and the associated stimulus to local government spending on
municipal services and to business spending on retail services, many
of which require a long gestation period to bring to fulfillment. This
argument rests essentially on the special characteristics of the in-
dustries benefitting from the induced demand—on product supply
conditions.
A second, and perhaps more compelling answer, is based on de-
mand considerations. Marriage, household formation, and migration
are points of critical decision in the life cycle of an individual. Typi-
cally, they involve commitment to new and increased spending over
several years as a new home is established and a family started or
settled, a commitment reflected in the substantial indebtedness to
relatives and financial institutions regularly incurred during this period
of the life On this basis, one might reason that in a population
experiencing a substantial rise in the growth of households there will
not only be a shift in the composition of consumption but a rise in the
propensity to consume as well. This would be sustained over several
years, carrying over from one business cycle to the next, and would
only gradually become exhausted. In effect, such long-term spending
commitments are geared to a notion of permanent income, and tend
to be rather insensitive to short-term income changes.
It is this feature of longer-term spending commitments which may
constitute the analytical key to Kuznets-cycle phenomena. The frequent
association of such commitments with series most noticeably marked
by long swings has been pointed out particularly by Abramovitz. Be-
cause this feature has so far received insufficient attention, his state-
ment merits repetition in full:
Charles Tiebout [165] has drawn a similar distinction between a long-run and
short-run multiplier, with population growth playing a central role in the former.
The most thorough study I have encountered of spending behavior in relation
to life-cycle stage (which is not synonymous with age) is that by Lansing and
Morgan [108], though even in this the stages are very broad. Consumer panel
studies should generate still more pertinent data. Ferber's article [64] provides a
valuable survey.
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One common attribute of all these processes of resource development
involving the movement of people from country to country and place to
place, the formation of households and the birth of children, the foundations
of business, and the investment of capital irs highly durable forms is that
they involve long-term decisions and commitments. Hence they pick up
speed and come to fruition slowly and when they slow down, they are not
easily or quickly set in motion again. They give rise, therefore, to long
waves of resource development and output growth. These processes in-
volving long-term decisions, on the other hand, respond only sluggishly
to the impact of the ordinary short and mild business contractions. By
contrast, the most prominent feature of short business cycles is a fluctuation
in shorter term investment, particularly inventory investment [5, p. 414].
While our concern here is with household behavior, it is worthwhile
to underscore Abramovitz's point that various types of private business
investment also involve longer-term commitments. Perhaps the most
notable of these arise in connection with the establishment of new
businesses, a phenomenon which, judging from the long-term series
on new incorporations (Figure 13) exhibits long swings in the un-
processed annual data.° (As for the future, the growth in importance
as spending units of various government bodies and private nonprofit
institutions, both potentially significant sources of long-term commit-
ments, suggests the need to study them as well.) This line of reasoning
obviously leads to the general view that Kuznets cycles may arise from
mechanisms, such as that discussed here, which result in a bunching of
long-term spending commitments.7
The Effect of Major Wars on Kuznets Cycles
The analytical model sketched above starts with a private invest-
ment boom, but any source of sustained increase in the growth of
aggregate demand, including government expenditure, could initiate
6Researchon investment spending by new firms (or, more generally, in relation
to the "life cycle" of business units)is scarce. One valuable study is that by
Bridge (23; cf. also 60, 2193.
A discussion of spending behavior inevitably leads on to the question of
financing, and thus to the role of monetary and financial variables in long swings.
While this subject is clearly "off-bounds," it may be noted that money supply, in-
terest rates, prices, capital imports (Figure 13), and similar variables do show
long swings [cf. 4, 22b, 41, 102, 113, 128a, 146a, and 216]. This subject, among
others, is treated in the forthcoming NBER study of trends in money, income, and
prices by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz.52 /I:NATURE OF DEMOCRAPHIC SWINGS
the process. In the case of major wars, however, the process is in-
terrupted, because the war itself places constraints on new house-
hold formation and construction. At the same time, a protracted war
sets the stage for a postwar Kuznets-cycle boom, by building up sub-
stantial backlogs not only for private and public investment but house-
hold formation and consumer spending as well. Thus, a major war
would tend, on the one hand, to interpose an additional fluctuation
during which the growth of GNP and aggregate construction pursue.
divergent paths; on the other hand, if one smooths this fluctuation
statistically, a major war would tend to yield a Kuznets-cycle move-
ment of more extended duration.
Are Kuznets Cycles Self-Generating?
While the interaction between economic and demographic phe-
nomena emphasized here ischiefly of a multiplier type, there are
clearly elements of induced investment on the basis of which one might
postulate a self-generating model of the multiplier-accelerator variety.
Also, the positive association between labor market tightness and
growth of aggregate demand implies the possibility of labor-cost
changes which may react on investment spending in an adverse man-
ner, tending to reverse the movement. On the other hand, irregular
events such as wars, legislative acts (e.g., regarding immigration and
wages), and speculative capital movements have affected observed
long swings. The relative weight of endogenous vs. exogenous factors
in initiating the swings is in my view an open question requiring
further research.
But the value of the present model does not hinge on resolution
of the self-generating issue. As Irma Adelman [81 and others have
shown, the Klein-Coldberger model of the regular business cycle is so
highly damped that it requires stochastic shocks to produce oscillations
of the business cycle variety. The principal value of that model lies in
suggesting mechanisms which tend to produce oscillatory movements
in response to such shocks. Similarly, while the present analytical
scheme leaves open the question whether Kuznets cycles may be
wholly self-generating or require either small or strong shocks, it does
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Long Swings and SecularGrowth
How,if at all, are Kuznets cycles related to the primary trend?
Is the primary trend itself merely the path traced out by averages of
successive Kuznets cycles? The answer suggested here is no. The pri-
mary trend reflects processes of technological change and of human
resource and institutional development which lie outside the long-
swing mechanism itself. However, in an economy where the free mar-
ket system plays an important role in resource allocation, the pace at
which new technology is adopted and diffused tends to be modified
by a Kuznets-cycle mechanism. This is because efficient use of the new
techniques flowing from the Industrial Revolution and its sequel has
required increased geographic concentration of productive resources.
This has created an imbalance between the geographic distribution of
the growth of labor demand, arising from the industrialization process,
and that of labor supply, which typically reflects the widespread pop-
ulation-dispersion characteristic of an agricultural society. Successful
adoption of modem industrial technology has required, therefore, re-
distribution of the population in conformity with the needs of the new
technological basis of production, and the provision of the requisite
goods and services for this relocated population. The induced stage of
the Kuznets-cycle mechanism, an urban development boom, is essen-
tially the accomplishment of this requirement in a free market economy
by a multiplier-type process.9
SClearly,the present analysis does not agree with the view proposed in a sub-
sequent paper [9] by Mrs. Adelman that a shocked Klein-Goldberger business
cyclemodelmay be sufficient to account for observed long swings. In this connec-
tion, it is worth noting that the simulated long swings that she obtained were of
smaller amplitude than those actually observed, and that the Klein-Goldherger
model does not incorporate economic-demographic interactions of the type de-
scribed here.
°Thelong swings in patent data, noted by Kuznets and Schmookler and
analyzed by the latter [103, 140], demonstrate that adoption of new techniques
is related to Kuznets cycles.
The above aims to identify those conditions which characteristically underlie the
observed association between modern economic growth and population redistribu-
tion. In certain cases, of which the United States is one, modern economic growth
may, in addition, involve the opening up and settlement of new territory, and thus
a further stimulus to population redistribution.
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For contrast, this formulation may be compared with that of Isard
[92, 93; see also 145]. He sees the swings as arising from successive
transport innovations, and the urbanization facet as a consequence of
the impact of such innovations on the location of economic activity.
The present view rests basically on the geographic imbalance between
labor demands and supplies created by modem technology generally,
and does not require a new transport innovation either to initiate the
swing or to account for urbanization, though such innovations may, of
course, play a part in particular times and places.
An implication of the present view is that various characteristics
of long swings tend to change secularly. The growth opportunities
constituting the investment focus at an early stage of development will
differ from those at a later stage; hence variations will tend to occur
over time in the industrial characteristics and geographical distribution
of the swing. For example, agricultural settlement or exports might
loom large among the investment opportunities in the early growth
stages; at a later time, domestic manufacturing may predominate.
Similarly the potential sources of labor supply tend to change secularly.
Immigrants may move more readily from one country at one time;
from another, at a different time. The reservoir afforded by the farm
population in older agricultural areas grows to a point but eventually
begins to be depleted, and is perhaps increasingly replaced as a source
of labor reserves by some of the nonfarm centers gradually being by-
passed in the development process. Secular growth in family income
and the appearance of innovations such as the automobile will alter
the composition of induced household consumption spending—recent
suburban as compared with earlier urban residential development is
an illustration of this.
The analytical scheme suggested here bears a superficial resem-
blance to Schumpeter's [141], for it implies that growth in a free mar-
ket economy tends to proceed in irregular surges. However, the dura-
tion of the movement differs from any contemplated by Schumpeter,
as does the underlying mechanism of economic-demographic interac-
tions. Moreover, with regard to secular growth, I would emphasize
the independent significance of processes such as technological change
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ing Schumpeter's conception to incorporate the building cycle [871
movedin the Kuznets-cycle direction. This step was carried forward
logically by Isard, who arrived at a view similar in a number of re-
spects to that advanced here. In so doing, Isard explicitly rejected
Hansen's secular-stagnation thesis, which, one suspects, could be shown
to run, in one form or another, a conforming Kuznets cycle of its own
in economic discussion. Indeed, in striking contrast to the contempo-
rary professional consensus, Isard, writing in 1942, predicted a post-
war boom. His reasoning, however, gave undue weight to transport
innovation which, as has been noted, is not an essential ingredient of
my analysis.
The analysis here may also bear on the problem of defining a
single given phase in the emergence of modern economic growth as
an "industrial revolution," "take-off" [139] or "great spurt of indus-
trialization" [75]. Attempts to apply such concepts to actual experience
have frequently come up against the difllculty of deciding which
among competing periods to so designate. And, where identified, the
duration and other characteristics of the period sometimes correspond
to those of Kuznets cycles. It is at least a plausible hypothesis that such
an interval, seized upon as a unique phase, may be an early and par-
ticularly prominent long swing.
RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE
LIGHT OF THE MODEL
Viewed in historical perspective, there are a number of similarities
between recetit and longer-term experience which are broadly con-
sistent with the crude analytical model sketched above. There are
differences, too, however, and on the demographic side these are so
serious as to raise doubts about the model's validity. In this section,
after noting some of these similarities, I focus on recent dissimilarities
with regard to demographic aspects and attempt to reconcile them
with the model.1°
10Theslackened growth rate of the economy in the cycies of 1953—57 and
1957—GO led several writers to point out similarities between recent experience
and earlier lapses from full employment growth [5, 8, 16, 30, 40, 57, 78, 79, 89,
90, 2171. Others, however, have taken sharp issue with such views [47, 63, 129].
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FIGURE 14
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE IN AGGREGATE PRODUCTION, AGGREGATE
CONSTRUCTION, WAGE RATE, AND HOURS; AND AVERACE LEVEL OF IMMIGRA-
TION RATE, NONFARM HOUSEHOLD GROWTH RATE, AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE,
NEER REFERENCE CYCLES, 1830—1964
I. Rate of change of aggregate production, percentage per year.
1. Nonperishable commodity output, 1860 dollars (Gallinan),
2. Index of industrial and commercial production, 1899 weights (Frickey).
3. Gross national product, 1929 dollars (Kendrick).
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Parallels Between Recent and Earlier Experience
The analytical framework suggests the likelihood of longer-term
fluctuations with roughly similar timing in output growth, labor mar-
ket conditions, and household growth, particularly in the nonagricul-
tural sector. For various reasons, other, perhaps independent, move-
ments might occur in these series, but one would expect as a minimum
that there would be some semblance of a common longer-term ryhthm.
Is this the case?
Figure 14 assembles series relating to a century or more of U.S.
experience on growth of aggregate output and construction, and indi-
cators of changes in labor market conditions (pre-1914 immigration,
hours, unemployment, wages), and in household growth (pre-1914
immigration and nonfarm households). A relatively moderate smooth-
ing technique has been employed. The values are averages for succes-
sive business cyclesasidentified by the NEER reference cycle
chronology, computed both for trough-to-trough and peak-to-peak
cycles and plotted at the cycle midpoints. Only one departure was
made from this procedure; it was warranted by the analytical con-
siderations previously presented. The special fluctuations associated
Legend for Figure 14 (concluded)
II. Rate of change of aggregate construction, percentage per year.
5. Gross new construction, 1860 dollars (Galiman).
8. Index of physical volume of construction (Abramovitz).
7. Gross new construction, 1929 dollars (Kuznets).
III. Rate of change of wage rate, percentage per year.
8. Money daily wages, Erie Canal (Smith).
9. Real hourly wages, manufacturing, 1957 cents (Long).
IV. Rate of change of average hours of work per week in manufacturing, per-
centage per year.
10. Jones.
11. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
V. Gross alien immigration rate per thousand total population per year.
12. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
VI. Rate of change of nonfarm households per thousand nonfarm households per
year.
13. Bureau of the Census.
VII. Unemployment rate, percentage of civilian labor force.
14. Lebergott.
15. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
To facilitate visual comparison of the series, vertical lines have been
drawn through the long-swing peaks and troughs of the rate of change in aggregate
construction, and the area from peak to trough has been shaded.
SOURCE: Table B-2.
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with World Wars I and II have been smoothed by ignoring the war-
time business cycle peak and first postwar trough." In this way, the
cycle average counterbalances the rise in government expenditure and
the subsequent decline to a more nearly postwar
Although certain variations in timing exist, it is possible, as sug-
gested by the shading in the figure, to identify swings in the growth
rate of aggregate output and construction, labor market conditions,
and household formation, on a roughly one-to-one basis, thus lending
some empirical plausibility to the model sketched above.'2 Some of
the swings are quite pronounced, such as those terminating in the
1890's and 1930's; others are milder, such as those ending around
World War I and the late 1950's. (The parallel between the recent
period and experience in the first part of this century was previously
pointed out by Hickman [90].) There is an apparent tendency for the
swings in the immigration rate, nonfarm household growth rate, and
level of the unemployment rate to lag behind the swing in the growth
in aggregate output, though not without exception.
Several other similarities between recent experience and previous
long swings may be mentioned. The growth rate of manufacturing
capital shows a swing, with the capital goods industries tending to
precede those oriented toward construction and urban development,
as in the pre-1914 period (Figure 12). Spatially, the swing continues
to center in nonfarm areas, appearing even more pronounced when
more up-to-date census definitions are employed (e.g., metropolitan
area rather than urban) and to exhibit wide diffusion among the dif-
ferent geographic divisions of the country. The postwar period has
been characterized by an urban and suburban development boom.
A swing in internal migration has also occurred [59, 158—160, 163].
Differences in Demographic Aspects
There have, of course, been differences between recent and pre-.
vious characteristics of long swings.18 As indicated in Chapter 2, on
11 Thus, in the case of World War II the peak-to-peak average is for 1937—48
rather than for 1937—44 and 1944—48; and the trough-to-trough average is for
1938—49 rather than 1938—46 and 1946—49.
12 The existence of long swings in the rate of change of wages has been pointed
out and analyzed by Clarence Long [1151. A statistically significant association
between the annual rate of change of wages and that of unemployment was found
by Bowen and Berry [21] in a study covering 1900—58.
13 For a more general discussion, see [5, 6, 90].
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the demographic side, these relate not so much to movements in the
aggregate variables, that is, growth of total population, total labor
force, and total households, as to the underlying components of change.
For the present purpose, it is convenient to group these components of
change as follows:
Population LaborForce
1. Mortality rate Mortality and agingMortality and aging
2. Net immigration rateNet immigration Net immigration
3. Fertility rate Labor force partici-Household headship rate
pation rate
All three of the aggregative demographic variables share in common
mortality and migration components. (The addition of the aging com-
ponent to mortality in both labor force and households is necessary
because these variables are defined with reference to a population
above some minimum age, and thus receive additions as those initially
below the limit grow older.) Each aggregative variable also has its
distinctive component: fertility rates in the case of population change,
labor force participation rates for labor force, and headship rates for
households. If one were dealing with a geographic subdivision of the
national total—for example, the nonfarm sector—internal migration
, would of course be included with international migration as a corn-
ponent of change.
The alignment of the components in the tabulationdesigned to
facilitate the subsequent discussion. From the viewpoint of demog-
raphy as such, the components of labor force and household growth
on line 1 are analogous to natural increase of the population, i.e., the
difference between components 1 and 3 of population growth.'5 This
grouping, however, is used to bring out parallel features for long-
swings analysis. Thus, the components on line 1 are largely exogenous
Iam in debt to Burnham Campbell for recognizing the possibility of the
present partition scheme for household growth [30, see also 621. A "headship rate"
is defined, along lines identical with that for a labor force participation rate, as
the proportion of the population in a given demographic group (e.g., classified by
age and sex) who are household heads.
Amore elaborate analysis would, in fact, further subdivide the components
of labor force and household growth on line 1 into, respectively, entries versus
exits and formations versus dissolutions. A brief investigation, chiefly for 1930
onward, suggests that the movements shown here in the net balance are over-
whelmingly due to the positive elements (entries and formations), just as those
in natural increase are typically a reflection of births.60 / I: NATURE OF DEMOGRAPHIC SWINGS
to a given long swing; those on lines 2 and 3 are responsive, with Line
2 representing a component common to all three variables (migra-
tion), and line 3, components which are distinctive. Moreover, since
in the subsequent discussion the components on line 3 are frequently
referred to collectively, it is convenient to designate each as the "rate"
component of its respective aggregate, though this terminology is
imprecise.
Figures 15 to 17 show for the nationwide values of each of the
aggregative variables, the relevant components of change for the
period since 1870 or 1880.16 The basic data—chiefly the decennial
censuses—are too crude to permit a highly refined analysis relating to
such questions as timing and amplitude; on the other hand, they
clearly show the swings, and permit certain broad inferences pertinent
to the comparison between recent and earlier experience. All three
figures show the predominant role of net immigration in the swing in
the aggregate throughout most of the period covered, but for the
swing from the 1930's through the late 1950's, the distinctive "rate"
component for each variable becomes paramount. Indeed, the move-
ment since 1940—up and then down—of the "rate" component in the
three figures is startlingly similar. Clearly this raises a question whether
the analytical model suggested in the previous section is indeed rele-
to current experience. In that model, migration played a key part,
filling the dual role of labor market response and source of household
growth. What happens to the model when migration no longer enters
into the swing in substantial magnitude?
In part, the answer to this is that migration in the form of internal
migration still enters in, and to this extent the model is pertinent in its
typical form. As noted, recent experience shows a continuation of the
historical swings in internal migration [59, 158—160, 183]. On the
other hand, although it is difficult to make temporal comparisons of
the amplitude of internal migration, there seems to be little evidence
that the current swing in the rate of internal migration reached greater
dimensions than previously, as would be necessary if it were to com-
pensate for the damped movement in international migration. More-
16 An alternative, or at least complementary, disaggregation would have been
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FIGURE 15
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF POPULA-
















over, the actual swings in population, labor force, and household
growth, even at the nonfarm level, were undoubtedly due in sub-
stantial part to the unprecedented movements in the distinctive "rate"
components, as well as to internal migration. Reconciliation of these
"rate" movements with the analytical model is therefore essential in
accounting for the quantitative features of the current swing. Since
these "rate" movements are, in fact, the main subjects of Parts II and
III, it will suffice here to summarize the pertinent findings.62 / I: NATURE OF DEMOGRAPHIC SWINGS
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Reasons for Recent Demographic Differences
The nature of the reconciliation is suggested by the model itself. It
turns on the suggestion that the character of the labor market response
to a Kuznets cycle in the growth of aggregate demand depends on the
nature of labor supply conditions. In the recent swing these conditions
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FIGURE 17
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FIGURE 18
MALE POPULATION AGED 15—29





immigration was severely curtailed by restrictions imposed since the
mid-1920's as well as by World War II itself. Second, the contribution
to labor force growth of the aging and mortality component reached an
unprecedented low (Figure 16). This was an echo effect of the excep-
tionally rapid decline of the birth rate in the twenties and early thirties,
and was particularly concentrated in the younger working ages, where,
so far as one can judge, for the first time in recorded experiencethe
absolute number of persons aged 15—29 leveled off and actually de-
clined slightly (Figure 18). This number showed a substantial decline
in relation to those aged 80—64 (Figure 18, lower panel). Finally, the
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proportionately higher than usual in the recent period (Figure 19).
This arose from the rapid expansion of secondary education in the
1920's and 1930's, which temporarily enlarged the educational gap
between young and old. Though there is now no historical evidence
on this, I suspect that it would be necessary to go fairly far back in
the nineteenth century to find a comparable period of rapid accelera-
tion in universal schooling.
FIGURE 19
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION AGED 25—29
AND 30—64 9—12 AND 13 OR MORE
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In short, in the most recent Kuznets-cycle upswing, the relative
number of those in young working ages was unusually low, and the
relative quality (so far as this depends on formal schooling) was un-
usually high. These young adults are precisely the ones who in the
past played an important part in the quantitative adjustment of labor
to the swing in the growth of aggregate demand, as is evidenced by
their predominance in migration flows, whether internal or interna-
tional. The unique labor supply conditions in the recent swing, how-
ever, resulted in an exceptionally tight labor market for those in the
younger age groups, and gave rise to unusually favorable income
growth (and, one suspects, to expectations of such growth as those
involved, learned by experience of the tightness of the labor market).
In other words, for younger persons, the labor market response took
the form predominantly of a price adjustment rather than a quantity
adjustment. This unusually favorable income situation for younger
persons, in turn, induced a sharp reduction in age at the time of
marriage and household formation, and a sharp upswing in fertility.
This accounts for the abrupt upsurge in the headship and fertility
rates. At the same time, the shortage of younger persons redounded to
the benefit of the only labor reserve group available in substantial
numbers—older married women who were unencumbered by child-
dependency responsibilities. As a result, a substantial increase in the
total labor force occurred through participation-rate change for the
first time. Thus, as in the past, an upswing in the growth of aggregate
demand was accompanied by labor market changes and an associated
rise in the growth rate of households which tended to sustain and pro-
long the boom. Because of the unique labor supply conditions, how-
ever, the mechanism of the association was substantially altered, with
migration playing a less important role and the "rate" components of
change in the demographic variables playing a leading one.
THE FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS OF
AN ECHO EFFECT
One of the intriguing features of population growth is that it contains
within itself a mechanism capable of generating longer-term swings.
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Thus, writing in 1937 about German experience, August Losch states
[118, p. 650]:
While the movement of population shows unimportant and irregular [short
term] fluctuations which seem to be mere reflections of economic, sanitary
and other conditions, we find quite clearly great waves, the main cause
of which are the great wars. The deficit of births during a war and the
surplus of births in the immediate postwar period repeat themselves about
thirty-three years later, when the new generations are at their time of
highest fertility. For-the same reason thirty-three years later a third wave
occurs.
Recognition of this leads naturally to the thought that long swings in
economic activity may have their origins in the peculiar structural
mechanism of population growth. My analysis of past U.S. experience,
however, does not support this view. Fluctuations in demographic
variables have typically arisen from movements in immigration or the
"rate" components of change rather than from an echo effect of a surge
in births, operating through the aging and mortality component.lr
Such demographic fluctuations were induced rather initiated by
changes in economic activity, although they had important feedback
effects. This is not to say that no echo effects at all existed. One can,
in fact, trace them in detailed data, but in the past they have been
mild, reflecting the fact that before 1940 long swings in fertility were
confined to the rate of change rather than the level of that variable.
Now, however, things have changed. The new demographic de-
velopments accompanying the most recent upswing—notably, the dra-
matic baby boom—have, in turn, echo effect currently being
felt in the of a sharp upsurge 1n the young adult population.
What, if any, are the implications of this echo effect for future long
swings? Has the economy, perhaps, shifted to a new situation in which
longswings are at least partly built in through a natural demographic
cycle, even though this was not the case in the past?
'7Therise between 1910—20 and 1920—30 in the aging and mortality com-
ponent, which contributed to a corresponding movement in labor force and house-
hold growth, appears to contradict this observation (Figures 18 and 17). This is
primarily due, however, not to an earlier upsurge in the birth rate, but to the fact
that the 1910—20 level of this component was depressed sharply below normal by
high mortality among young persons resulting from the flu epidemic of 1918. Thus,
with reference to Figure 15, the movement is chiefly a reflection, not of a prior
fluctuation in the fertility curve, but of a concurrent dip in the mortality curve
(inverted), centering on 1910—20.
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A satisfactory analysis of this question, as of so many this chapter
has touched on, calls for a more complete model of long swings.
Nevertheless, a few tentative impressions may be gained by looking
in some detail at the impact of the echo effect on labor force and
household growth now and in the coming decade. Moreover, this is of
interest in its own right because of its possible bearing on attempts to
assess more generally the outlook for the next decade.18
The Next Decade
To start with labor supply conditions, the echo effect of The baby
boom is currently yielding its fruits in the form of an unprecedented
growth in the labor force from the aging and mortality component.
Since the first half of the 1950's, the rate at which this source has been
contributing to labor force growth has risen from around 5 to 11 per
cent per decade, and the projected figure for the last half of the 1960's is
almost 14 per cent. This means that the aging and mortality component
alone in the late 1960's will yield a rate of growth in the total labor
force as high as that due to all components in the 1940's, and higher
than that in the 1950's. The impact of this is concentrated among thç
younger age groups, with the result that the relative number of those
aged 15—29 to 30—64 is now increasing more and faster than in the
preceding decline (Figure 18). Moreover, an independent but signifi-
cant development is that the advantage of young over old in high
school education has declined sharply in the last decade and will
decline somewhat further in the next (Figure 19). With regard to
college education, the advantage of the young rose somewhat through
1965, but shows little prospect of further increase. On the whole,
therefore, a substantial reversal of the situation in the preceding
period as to relative quantity and quality of younger versus older per-
sons is now in progress.
The marked impact of the aging and mortality component on
labor force growth suggests that the labor requirements of an upswing
in the growth of aggregate demand might for the first time be met
very largely from this component rather than from either increased
18 Cf. for example [1481. Interestingly, this NICB study, while not adopting a
long-swings framework as such, looks at the next decade on the basis of experience
in the past two, viewed not as a succession of short cycles, but as a major boom
and ensuing retardation.
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immigration or participation-rate change. (One would expect also, of
course, a response through internal migration, perhaps taking more
the form of a movement among nonf arm centers as the farm reservoir
becomes even further depleted.) Would this rather different labor
market response be accompanied by an upsurge in household growth
as in the past?
One's initial reaction is to say, "of course," for the same demo-
graphic echo effect that is operating to raise labor force growth is
also acting to increase household growth. On investigation, however,
several mitigating circumstances come to light.
First, there is a difference in the timing and shape of the impact
of the demographic movement on labor force versus household growth.
The average age at labor force entry is lower than that of household
formation, so that an echo effect tends to raise labor force growth in
advance of household growth. This is illustrated in Figure 20, where
the contributions of population change to labor force and household
FIGURE 20
CONTRIBUTION OF POPULATION CHANGE TO
LABOR FORCE AND HOUSEHOLD GROWTH:
ACTUAL, DECENNIALLY, 1930—50, QUINQUEN-
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growth since the 1930's are compared.'9 Note that the movement in
household growth tends to lag behind that in labor force growth,
reaching its trough and then its peak roughly five years later. More-
over, the rise in household growth is somewhat smaller in amplitude
and less precipitous than that in labor force growth. This is because
among young males the rise in rates of household headship not only
centers at a later age than that in labor force participation, but is
also less abrupt. As a result, the temporal distribution of an echo
effect on household growth is more attenuated than it is on labor force
growth. Thus, while the baby boom does produce an echo effect
tending to raise household as well as labor force growth, the former
tends to lag behind the latter and be slightly more spread out over
time.
Second, in order for an echo effect in the population component
of change to raise the total growth rate of households—that due to all
sources—it is necessary that the headship-rate component not decline
in compensating fashion. Since the analysis for 1940—55 has already
suggested the possibility of a mechanism causing the population and
"rate" components to move in at least partly offsetting fashion, it is
essential to appraise the outlook for the rate component as well as
that for the population one. This is facilitated by Figure 21, which
repeats the curves of Figure 20 for labor force and households and
adds the curves showing growth due to all sources (actual through
1960—64 and projected through 1975_80).20 For each variable, the
vertical difference between the two curves represents the contribution
of the rate component.
The startling feature of Figure 21 is that while the echo effect is
currently producing and, according to the projection, is to produce
a sharp rise in the growth rate of labor force, an upsurge of comparable
magnitude in that of households, even with a lag, is not foreseen. In
the case of labor force, in order to offset the echo effect completely,
19Forconvenience of exposition, immigration has been combined here with the
aging and mortality effect. The point remains valid if confined to aging and
mortality alone, since the movements during the period shown are due almost en-
tirely to this component.
20Forhouseholds, Series B projections are used, but the use of Series A would
not alter the present conclusions, since from 1965 on the growth rates implied by
the two projections differ very little.70 /I:NATURE OF DEMOGRAPHIC SWINGS
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the contribution of the "rate" component would have to drop to a
negative value, that is, participation rates would, on the average, have
to decline. This is not the case with regard to households, however.
The contribution of the "rate" component has been so high in the
past, that a drop to a lower positive value, implying merely a
retardation in the average rise of headship rates, is sufficient to almost
wholly offset the echo effect.
Is a slowing of the rise in headship rates, such as that implied by
L —4THE ANALYTICAL MODEL / 71
the projection, likely? Actual experience in the first half of this decade
compared with 1955—60 does show such a tendency. Although further
study is needed, two considerations suggesting the likelihood of its
continuation may be noted, one endogenous and one exogenous. First,
even under relatively high employment conditions, the change in
relative quality and quantity of young workers which is now taking
place means that they are unlikely to enjoy an excess demand
situation comparable to that of 1940—55. Hence, it seems doubtful
that a significant contribution to household growth through increases
in headship rates will occur among this group. Second, an important
factor raising household growth in the past fifteen years has been
the noticeable rise in headship rates among the older population,
aged 55 and over, and it is questionable that this will continue at
the same pace. A principal factor in this has been the rapid extension
of social security coverage. The percentage receiving OASDI benefits
in the relevant population groups provides a rough though imperfect
indication: 21
1950 1963 (projected)
Males aged 80—64 0 18 22
Males aged 65 andover 25 78 89
Females aged 60—64







Although projections relating to such politically sensitive areas are
patently hazardous, the figures provide some justification for the view
that the economy has largely passed through the period when the
adoption of social security would have its largest impact on headship
rates among the older population. Though some additional growth
from this source is probable, its quantitative importance seems likely
to be less than in the immediate past.22
I am grateful to Francisco Bayo, of the Social Security Administration, for the
absolute data on beneficiaries, on the basis of which these percentages were com-
puted.
22 This discussion bears on Edward F. Denison's criticism (47, p. 5311 that
the long-wave background gets [Burnham] Campbell no farther than others
who have based forecasts of housing starts on the normal increase in households
that would result from population changes in relevant age-sex groups The
present analysis suggests that not only the population component of household
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To sum up, although a more thorough investigation is needed, this
analysis makes clear that in the current and coming decade, contrary
to what one might expect, an upswing in household growth is neither
a simultaneous nor automatic accompaniment of a surge in labor
force growth arising from the echo effect of the baby boom. True,
there is an echo effect exerting an upward pressure on household
growth, but it lags behind that in labor force growth and is more
attenuated. In addition, there are circumstances, partly endogenous
and partly exogenous, which may dampen this upward pressure by
slowing the rise in headship rates among young and old, thereby
reducing the contribution to household growth from the "rate" com-
ponent source. Therefore, under such new circumstances of labor
supply, in which an echo effect supplies the labor requirements arising
from an upswing in the growth of aggregate demand, it is far from
clear that a substantial reinforcing stimulus to the boom from an
upsurge in household growth will occur as it did in the past.
Longer-Term Future
Though atfirst glance itis tempting to pronounce that the
emergence of an echo effect has created a new "built-in" long-swing
mechanism, a more careful look at current changes and those in
prospect over the next decade creates doubt that any such simple
generalization is warranted. However, more study of the determinants
of household growth by age group is needed, including attention to
"gross" changes (formations and dissolutions) and their implications
for spending. (Clearly, implications for spending when social security
forestalls dissolution of a home are likely to be quite different from
those arising from accelerated household formation among young
persons.) The relative weight of endogenous vs. exogenous elements
in labor force and household growth needs clarification too. For
example, while the present analytical scheme suggests that there is
approach may be of value in clarifying the movements in the "rate" component.
The reference to OASDI, however, shows clearly that other factors are pertinent
and that more intensive study is needed of the determinants of headship rate
changes, including factors such as school enrollment and marital status. Clearly,
throughout this analysis, no attempt has been made to consider the possible bearing
of the Vietnam War.
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to be at least partly offsetting for both labor force and household
growth, the dampening at present appears to be greater for household
growth. Is this attributable wholly to exogenous circumstances or is
it partly inherent in the mechanism? Moreover, perhaps undue atten-
tion has been given here to demographic reactions from the household
growth side. In commenting on this chapter, Abramovitz pointed
out that, in addition to such considerations, accelerated growth in
labor force, for whatever reason, may at least permit a protracted
boom to be sustained by keeping the "natural rate" of output growth
above the "warranted rate" for a longer period, thus postponing the
time when an output ceiling may act as a brake on long-term capital
investment.
Certainly the emergence of demographic echo effects is a new
phenomenon which must be reckoned with in assessing the longer-
term future. For example, another possibility, though not the only
one, is that an echo effect creates a tendency toward waves in labor
force growth with a duration longer than Kuznets cycles and, at the
same time, upswings in the growth of aggregate demand initiated
by nondemographic factors occur with the frequency of past Kuznets
cycles. Under such circumstances, the impact of the demand movement
on the labor market the reactions stemming therefrom could
be highly variable, depending on whether the flood, ebb, or some
intermediate stage of labor force growth prevailed at the time. In
this connection, it should be noted that the current decline in the
crude birth rate has, in only eight years, wiped out the increase since
1940. (This is not true, however, of age-adjusted fertility measures.)
Beyond 1975, this will produce a shift in relative numbers of young
and old in a direction similar to that of the 1940's and early 1950's
(cf. Figure 18). If aggregate demand conditions are favorable, this
creates the possibility of economic-demographic interactions at that
time like those of the post-World War II era.
Finally, thereis nothing in this analysis which implies that
Kuznets cycles in the economy's growth rate are not susceptible to
elimination through appropriate policy measures. If the emphasis74 / I: NATURE OF DEMOGRAPHIC SWINGS
on the central role of aggregate demand is correct, then, as Abramovitz
and Hickman have also suggested, manipulation of effective demand
should make it possible largely to eliminate discernible long swings.
A R T But the analysis does imply that determination of the appropriate FER]
policy measures may call for more attention to variables and relation-
ships of the type suggested here than has been customary in the past. 